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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
Rosenn, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal primarily presents a novel question in this 
Circuit concerning the constructive notice provisions of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1058, the application of a statute 
of limitations borrowed from the state of Pennsylvania, and 
the tolling principles of that state. The United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
dismissed the action for fraudulent re-registration of a 
trademark as time barred, and the remainder of the 
complaint for lack of standing, failure to state a claim, and 
pendant jurisdiction. The plaintiffs timely appealed. We 




In 1981, Marion J. Vujevich filed an application for the 
registration of the trademark "DPM" with the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") for use in interstate 
commerce of medicated and non-medicated cosmetics. In 
1983, Vujevich obtained the registration of the trademark 
and listing as the sole user of the trademark. Vujevich and 
BJV, a limited partnership in which Vujevich participated, 
used this trademark exclusively until 1987. 
 
In 1987, Vujevich allegedly agreed to form a corporation 
with R. Richard Riso to manufacture and distribute 
products bearing the DPM trademark. This new 
corporation, Beauty Time, Inc., a Delaware corporation, of 
which Riso is the sole shareholder, began distributing 
products in or about August 1987 bearing the DPM 
trademark. Plaintiffs allege that Vujevich had orally 
assigned the DPM mark to Beauty Time in 1987 for its 
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exclusive use and Beauty Time claims to have used the 
mark exclusively from 1987 to 1991. 
 
In February, 1989, Vujevich filed a combined §§ 8 and 15 
declaration1 in his own name as owner and registrant with 
the PTO seeking renewal of the trademark in accordance 
with federal trademark registration law. Vujevich filed an 
affidavit in connection with the declaration asserting that 
he was the sole owner and user of the trademark. Vujevich 
allegedly used Beauty Time packaging in support of this 
declaration. In July, 1989, the ownership of the trademark 
became "incontestable" and the PTO renewed Vujevich's 
registration of the DPM trademark, with no mention of the 
alleged assignment of the mark to Beauty Time and its 
junior use of the mark. 
 
In 1991, Vujevich allegedly began marketing and selling 
items bearing the DPM trademark without the consent of 
Beauty Time or Riso. According to the plaintiffs, these 
products were distributed under the names VU Skin 
Systems and DPM Skin Systems. Beauty Time 
unsuccessfully sought to compel Vujevich to cease from 
distributing these products bearing the DPM trademark. In 
August, 1994, Vujevich informed a number of purchasers 
and retailers of the Beauty Time products that he, Vujevich, 
was the owner of the DPM trademark and that Beauty Time 
was infringing on the trademark. Most of these customers 
stopped purchasing Beauty Time products based upon 
Vujevich's assertions of ownership. 
 
In July, 1995, Riso ascertained that Vujevich had re- 
registered the trademark in 1989 listing Vujevich as the 
sole owner and user of the trademark. Soon thereafter, the 
plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants 
seeking cancellation of the trademark, declaratory and 
injunctive relief, and monetary damages. The amended 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (Supp. 1997) provides for the cancellation of a prior 
registration of a mark "unless within one year next preceding the 
expiration of [six years from the date of the original registration] the 
registrant shall file in the Patent and Trademark Office an affidavit" 
showing that mark is still in use. Upon filing of such affidavit, the right 
to use the mark under certain conditions may become incontestable to 
15 U.S.C. § 1065 (Supp. 1997). 
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complaint asserted eleven counts: four federal counts 
[trademark infringement (I), false advertising (II), false 
designation in interstate commerce (III), and fraud under 
the Lanham Act (XI)] and seven state statutory and 
common-law counts [violation of the state anti-dilution 
statute (IV), common law trademark infringement (V), 
fraudulent misrepresentation (VI), breach of contract (VII), 
tortious interference with contract (VIII), unjust enrichment 
(IX), and misappropriation (X)]. The district court dismissed 
the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. The court dismissed Count XI as 
time-barred, Counts I through V for lack of standing, and 
the remainder for lack of pendant jurisdiction. The plaintiffs 






Plaintiffs first challenge the district court order 
dismissing their claim of fraud under the Lanham Act as 
time-barred. The district court's application of the statute of 
limitations and the relevant tolling principles is subject to 
plenary review. Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 v. 2300 
Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991). The 
Lanham Act contains no express statute of limitations and 
the general rule is that when a federal statute provides no 
limitations for suits, the court must look to the state 
statute of limitations for analogous types of actions. A claim 
for fraud under the Lanham Act conforms to this general 
rule. See Official Airlines Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 
1395 (9th Cir. 1993); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. American 
Guardian Life Assurance Co., 943 F. Supp. 509, 517 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996). See also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 
(1985). On this claim, it is undisputed that Pennsylvania's 
two-year statute of limitations for fraud actions would 
apply. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7) (Supp. 1997). 
Accordingly, Pennsylvania tolling principles would also be 
applicable in determining whether this suit is time-barred. 
See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-67; Board of Regents of the 
Univ. of the State of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 
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487-88 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 
421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations begins 
to run at the time the "the right to institute and maintain 
the suit arises." Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono 
Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983). In the present 
matter, the allegedly fraudulent act occurred in 1989, when 
Vujevich re-registered the trademark with the PTO claiming 
that he was the sole owner and user of the DPM mark. 
Thus, absent any exceptions, the statute of limitations 
would have run in 1991, two years after the fraudulent act 
allegedly occurred. 
 
Because we look to state law for the appropriate statute 
of limitations, we also look to Pennsylvania law on the 
closely related questions of tolling and application. See 
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 264 n.17. It is well-established that 
Pennsylvania law recognizes an exception to the statute of 
limitations which "delays the running of the statute until 
the plaintiff knew, or through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have known, of the injury and its cause." 
Urland v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 822 F.2d 1268, 
1271 (3d Cir. 1987). Courts employ the "same `knew or 
should have known' standard whether the statute is tolled 
because of the discovery rule or because of fraudulent 
concealment." Id. at 1273. Generally, courts have followed 
the old chancery rule adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court that when a party "has been injured by 
fraud and `remains in ignorance of it without any fault or 
want of diligence or care on his part, the bar to the statute 
does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though 
there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of 
the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the 
knowledge of the other party.' " Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 
U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 
342, 348). 
 
Regardless of the grounds for seeking to toll the statute, 
the plaintiff is expected to exercise reasonable diligence in 
attempting to ascertain the cause of any injury. Urland, 822 
F.2d at 1273-74. Reasonable diligence has been defined as 
follows: "A fair, proper and due degree of care and acting, 
measured with reference to the particular circumstances; 
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such diligence, care, or attention as might be expected from 
a man of ordinary prudence and activity." Black's Law 
Dictionary 457 (6th ed. 1991). As the court observed in 
Urland, there are few facts which diligence cannot discover, 
but there must be some reason to awaken inquiry and 
suggest investigation. Urland, 822 F.2d at 1273. Plaintiffs 
assert that they had no reason to check the registration of 
the trademark with the PTO until they became aware that 
the trademark had been re-registered in 1989 listing 
Vujevich as its sole owner and user. The question thus 
becomes when did or when should the plaintiffs have 
become aware of the concerns regarding the re-registration 
of the trademark DPM. 
 
The dissent mistakenly believes that Pennsylvania has 
carved out a separate tolling rule that "governs in fraud 
actions," a rule which would inexplicably make it more 
difficult to toll the statute of limitations when the defendant 
has engaged in fraud. Under the dissent's view, the 
discovery rule has no application in cases of fraud unless 
the fraud thereafter has been actively concealed by the 
wrongdoer. This erroneous concept arises out of a 
misunderstanding of the origin and application of the 
discovery and fraudulent concealment rules in 
Pennsylvania's tolling of its statute of limitations. 
 
Initially, Pennsylvania's Statute of Limitations (Act of 
June 24, 1895, P.L. 236 § 2) provided that every suit to 
recover damages for personal injuries not resulting in death 
must be brought within two years from the time of injury. 
Similarly, the statute provided for limitations for tortious 
actions with respect to personal and real property, and 
other specific misconduct. The statute made no provision 
for tolling or reference to fraud.2 Thus, under that statute, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In 1982, the Pennsylvania legislature amended the statute of 
limitations relating to torts by adding a provision specifically governing 
fraud actions. The new section provides for a two-year statute of 
limitations for: 
 
Any other action or proceeding to recover damages for injury to 
person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or 
otherwise tortious conduct or any other action or proceeding 
sounding in trespass, including deceit and fraud, except an action 
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even where a personal injury or other tort was unknown to 
the victim, a claim not brought within two years was 
barred. From time to time, Pennsylvania courts were 
confronted with cases arising out of fraudulent misconduct 
where the literal enforcement of the statute would leave the 
victim without remedy, even when the fraud did not become 
known to the victim until the statute of limitations had run. 
 
Thus, in Smith v. Blachley, 198 Pa. 173, 47 A. 985 
(1901), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania wrestled with 
whether the general rule that the statutes of limitations 
runs from the act complained of should admit an exception 
at least on account of fraud. The exception, not in the 
statutes, had been judicially introduced by some courts 
"acting upon principles of equity." Id. at 985. Those courts 
applied the principle that the fraud, although complete, 
operates as a continuing cause of action until discovered. 
In Blachley, the court concluded that it would allow an 
exception to toll the statute in cases of fraud only if the 
wrongdoer added to his original fraud affirmative efforts to 
mislead or prevent discovery. Id. at 987. This was 
Pennsylvania's recognition, although modest, that in cases 
of fraud an exception under certain circumstances should 
be made, not with the objective of constricting the statute 
of limitations but, as a matter of equity and fairness, to 
relax it in matters of fraud. 
 
More than a half-century later, however, Pennsylvania 
had another opportunity to modernize its tolling principles 
and make them more consistent with the humanizing 
legislation that the State had enacted with the advent of the 
20th century. Thus, in Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 
A.2d 788 (1959), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for the 
first time announced its "discovery rule."3 In Ayers, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
or proceeding subject to another limitation specified in this 
subchapter. 
 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(7) (Supp. 1997). Prior to 1982, the 
statute of limitations for fraud claims was six years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 5527 (1981). 
 
3. Ayers relied considerably in its analysis on Lewey v. H.C. Frick Coke 
Co., 166 Pa. 536, 31 A. 261 (1895), a case decided six years before 
Blachley, for its enunciation of the "discovery rule." Inexplicably, 
Blachley makes no mention of Lewey. We discuss Lewey more fully 
beginning at page 8. 
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court found itself confronted with a medical malpractice 
case where the defendant surgeon allegedly left a sponge in 
his patient's abdomen which was not discovered until 
almost nine years later. 
 
The trial court entered judgment for the defendant 
because of the same two-year statute of limitations 
considered by the court in Blachley in 1901. The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania reversed. In announcing the 
discovery rule, the court did not confine it merely to 
personal injury actions. In fact, the court analogized that in 
a contract action, "the plaintiff is not prevented from filing 
suit after the statute of limitations has expired, if fraud has 
intervened," Ayers, 157 A.2d at 792, and if he has not slept 
on his rights. The court, therefore, held that the plaintiff 
was entitled to proceed with his action against the surgeon 
after the two-year statutory period expired because of the 
nature of the concealment. Id. at 794. 
 
The defendant in Ayers argued that there was no 
concealment on its part. The court summarily dismissed 
this argument with the statement that no "greater 
concealment" was necessary than leaving a foreign 
substance within the folds of a patient's intestines until its 
discovery nine years later. Id. There is nothing in the 
court's opinion that confines its rationale to personal injury 
cases. On the contrary, it referred to tolling the statute in 
contract actions where fraud has intervened, to criminal 
actions where the defendant has fled the jurisdiction, and 
to its earlier decision in Lewey v. H.C. Frick Coke Co., 166 
Pa. 536, 31 A. 261 (1895), where the defendant had 
committed outright fraud in extracting subterranean coal 
from the plaintiff's land. 
 
In Lewey, the plaintiff did not learn of the fraudulent 
pilfering until seven years after the deed was done. 31 A. at 
261. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant on 
the basis of the six-year statute of limitations. In reversing 
and ordering a new trial, the court stated that to hold that 
the statute begins to run at the date of the trespass under 
such circumstances -- a case clearly not involving a 
personal injury -- constitutes "[a] result so absurd and so 
unjust [as] ought not be possible." Id. at 263. The court 
took notice of the equity rule in English courts: that "[i]t 
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was against good conscience to permit one who had taken 
the property of another without the owner's knowledge, and 
who had failed to disclose . . . what he had taken, to avail 
himself of the statute [of limitations] while the owner 
remained in ignorance of his loss." Id. 
 
In Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 
A.2d 468 (Pa. 1983), the suit involved the negligent 
operation of a truck which damaged a tunnel on plaintiff's 
land. This case also concerned a suit over an injury to real 
property and not a personal injury action. The trial court 
entered summary judgment for the defendant on the 
ground that the statute of limitations had expired. Pocono 
Int'l, 468 A.2d at 470. The superior court reversed and 
remanded for trial, holding that the discovery rule applied, 
tolling the statute of limitations until the damage was 
reasonably ascertained by the Raceway. Id. at 470-71. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the court 
reaffirmed the application of the discovery rule to property 
actions and its holding in Lewey. Although it reversed the 
superior court because it concluded that the plaintiff had 
the ability to ascertain the cause of action and institute suit 
within the applicable period of limitations, it held that the 
discovery rule exception "arises from the inability of the 
injured, despite the exercise of due diligence, to know of the 
injury or its cause." Id. at 471. 
 
One of the leading cases discussing the Pennsylvania 
statute of limitations and its tolling principles is Gee v. 
CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 612 F.2d 572 
(3d Cir. 1979). Applying Pennsylvania law in a contract 
dispute, then District Judge Edward Becker wrote: 
 
As we understand the case law, there are several 
separate inquiries we must make under facts as alleged 
here. The first is whether the underlying events being 
sued upon . . .sound inherently in fraud or deceit. If 
they do then that, without more, will toll the statute of 
limitations until such time as the fraud has been 
revealed, or should have been revealed by the exercise 
of due diligence by plaintiffs. This doctrine finds 
expression in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Holmberg 
v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397, 66 S.Ct. 582, 585, 90 
L.Ed. 743 (1946): 
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(T)his Court long ago adopted as its own the old 
chancery rule that where a plaintiff has been injured 
by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any 
fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar 
to the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is 
discovered, though there be no special circumstances 
or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud 
to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party. 
 
Holmberg is based on the premise that fraud as a 
common-law cause of action is self-concealing by its 
nature. . . . As long as plaintiff continues to reasonably 
rely to his detriment on the knowingly misleading 
representation the fraud continues, and of necessity it 
is concealed from plaintiff. No additional special efforts 
of concealment are then necessary. 
 
Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 622-23 (footnote omitted). Judge 
Becker continued: 
 
Fraudulent concealment does not depend, as do 
Holmberg and Nesbitt, on the underlying cause of 
action . . . being inherently fraudulent. Rather, it 
requires independent acts of "fraudulent concealment" 
of the events or circumstances constituting the 
underlying cause of action, irrespective of whether 
those underlying events are inherently fraudulent or 
not. 
 
Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 623. 
 
This court has adopted the reasoning of Gee, recognizing 
that "Pennsylvania's inherent fraud doctrine, as set forth in 
Gee, focuses on whether the underlying events are based 
on fraud or deceit. If they are, `then that, without more, will 
toll the statute of limitations until such time as the fraud 
has been revealed or should have been revealed by the 
exercise of due diligence by plaintiffs." Sheet Metal Workers, 
949 F.2d at 1280 (quoting Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 622). The 
court noted that the "alternative doctrine" of fraudulent 
concealment applied "[i]rrespective of any inherent fraud." 
Id. Thus, the dissent in this case has misconstrued 
Pennsylvania's tolling principles and would apply the 
fraudulent concealment doctrine in an action involving 
inherent fraud. As noted above, when the underlying claim 
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sounds in fraud, the statute of limitations is tolled by the 
tortious conduct, without any further action by the 
wrongdoer, until the fraud should have been discovered by 
the plaintiffs. 
 
In the instant case, the dissent believes that the time 
when the plaintiffs discovered or in the exercise of due 
diligence should have discovered the fraud is irrelevant 
because in an action for fraud in Pennsylvania the statute 
of limitations is not tolled, even if fraud is concealed, 
"unless such fraud has been actively concealed by the 
wrongdoer," citing Turtzo v. Boyer, 370 Pa. 526, 88 A.2d 
884, 885 (1952). There is no such general rule in 
Pennsylvania, although this rule may apply in certain 
special circumstances, such as a situation where the 
plaintiff claims the defendant's wrongful conduct estops the 
latter from pleading the statute of limitations. Were it the 
general rule, a bank could not recover money secretly 
peculated by a bank officer and not discovered until after 
the statute of limitations had run, unless the wrongdoer 
actively concealed the fraud. Thus, if there were no active 
concealment of the peculation after the initial fraud, there 
could be no recovery. That makes no sense. 
 
Turtzo is inapposite. First, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania decided Turtzo before it announced the 
"discovery rule" several years later in Ayers. Actually, 
Turtzo is an application of the due diligence component of 
the later announced discovery rule that when the plaintiff 
reasonably could have timely discovered the filing of a 
fraudulent nominating petition for Justice of the Peace and 
had in fact "visited the office of the County Board of 
Elections and inspected the petition within the week after 
its filing," 88 A.2d at 885, the plaintiff cannot claim that 
fraud vitiates the entire proceedings. "[F]raud when 
discovered must be acted upon with dispatch." Id. However, 
in the instant case, there is no evidence of record to show 
when the plaintiffs reasonably could have discovered the 
alleged fraud. Therefore, remand is required. 
 
The cases relied upon by the dissent for the proposition 
that the statute of limitations in an action grounded in 
fraud is tolled only if the fraud thereafter has been actively 
concealed by the wrongdoer are inapplicable to the instant 
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case. Turtzo addressed a very specific provision of the state 
election code establishing a statute of limitations for 
contesting nomination petitions and did not address the 
state's general statute of limitations for tort claims. Turtzo, 
88 A.2d at 885. In re Estate of Doerr, 565 A.2d 1207 (Pa. 
Super. 1989), addressed a specific provision of 
Pennsylvania's probate code establishing a statute of 
limitations for challenging wills; In re Thorne's Estate, 25 
A.2d 811 (Pa. 1942), addressed a statute of limitations 
under the Fiduciaries Act. Again, neither case addresses 
Pennsylvania's general statute of limitations for tort claims. 
Additionally, Thorne's Estate and Dalzell v. Lewis, 97 A. 
407, 408-09 (Pa. 1916), both preceded Ayres and the 
development of the discovery rule in Pennsylvania, as did 
Turtzo. 
 
Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow 
Chemical, U.S.A., 566 A.2d 591 (Pa. Super. 1989), cited by 
the dissent, is also inapplicable. In that case, the college 
asserted that Dow fraudulently misrepresented that a 
chemical used in construction would not cause defects in 
the building. Id. at 594. The trial court dismissed the claim, 
finding it was barred by the six year statute of limitations 
then applicable to fraud actions, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.§ 5527. 
Id. The college appealed, arguing that the statute was tolled 
until the college discovered the alleged fraud. Id. at 599. 
The superior court cited the rule of Turtzo, noting that "[i]f 
the party committing fraud is also guilty of some acts of 
concealment or deception which hides from the plaintiff 
that he has a cause of action, then the statute will run 
from the time discovery of the alleged fraud is made, or in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been 
made." Id. (citing Turtzo v. Boyer, 88 A.2d 884 (Pa. 1952)). 
The court then concluded that the college, in light of all the 
circumstances, could not have reasonably relied on the 
initial fraudulent misrepresentation, thereby determining 
that no cause of action for fraud would lie, regardless of the 
statute of limitations. Thus, Northampton County, 
announcing a rule from Turtzo but not applying it, is simply 
an insufficient basis upon which to disregard the 
substantial body of precedent establishing that an act of 
fraud, by itself, will toll the statute of limitations until that 
 
                                12 
fraud reasonably should have been discovered by the 
plaintiffs. See Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 622. 
 
In fact, as the Superior Court of Pennsylvania itself has 
noted, the practical difference between the discovery rule 
and fraudulent concealment in fraud cases has been "much 
reduced." In Bickell v. Stein, the court said: 
 
Appellee cites Smith v. Blachley, 198 Pa. 173, 179, 47 
A. 985 (1901) and Turtzo v. Boyer, 370 Pa. 526, 528, 
88 A.2d 884 (1952) for the proposition that in actions 
for fraud, the statutory limitation may only be tolled by 
proof of "fraudulent concealment" of the original fraud. 
The doctrine of fraudulent concealment appears 
somewhat narrower than the discovery rule, because it 
requires a showing that defendant himself prevented 
plaintiff from discovering the facts by acts of deception 
which were independent of the acts giving rise to cause 
of action. However, the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment has been relaxed considerably with regard 
to the deceptive intent of defendant's acts and their 
independence of the underlying, operative facts (see 
Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co., 416 Pa. 89, 204 A.2d 473 
(1952); Schwab v. Cornell, 306 Pa. 536, 106 A. 449 
(1932); Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F.Supp. 600, 617-634 
(E.D. Pa., 1979); Hedges v. Primavera, 218 F.Supp. 797 
(E.D. Pa., 1963)), so that the practical difference 
between the two rules is much reduced. Furthermore, 
Smith and Trutzo [sic] are reconcilable with the 
discovery rule, because both are cases in which the 
court observed that the fraud was obvious or easily 
discoverable by a prudent individual. 
 
435 A.2d 610, 612 n.3 (Pa. 1981). 
 
Application of the discovery rule to fraud claims will not 
eviscerate the statute of limitations because aggrieved 
parties must still bring their claim within two years of when 
they learned or should have learned, through the exercise 
of due diligence, that they have a cause of action.4 "For 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We concur with the dissent that the cases interpreting Pennsylvania's 
tolling rules have not been entirely free from ambiguity. However, the 
rule set forth in Gee and affirmed by this court is clear, and the courts 
of Pennsylvania have not altered this rule despite the opportunity to do 
so. See, e.g., Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 
468 (Pa. 1983); Bickell v. Stein, 435 A.2d 610 (Pa. Super. 1981). 
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statute of limitations purposes, a claimant need only be put 
on inquiry notice by `storm warnings' of possible fraud." 
Ciccarelli v. Gichner Systems Group, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 
1293, 1301 (M.D. Pa. 1994). Therefore, we conclude that 
the discovery rule applies in Pennsylvania when the 
underlying cause of action sounds in fraud, and that the 
statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff learns or 
reasonably should have learned through the exercise of due 




The district court determined that the plaintiffs are time- 
barred from bringing the action based upon the 
constructive notice provision of the Lanham Act that 
registration of a mark "shall be constructive notice of the 
registrant's claim of ownership thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 1072 
(1963). The court held that the plaintiffs "were on 
constructive notice of any fraud committed by Vujevich in 
re-registering the mark DPM as of the date that the re- 
registration occurred in 1989." The plaintiffs argue, 
however, that state law tolling principles would not 
recognize constructive notice pursuant to § 1072 as 
sufficient notice of the fraud to cause the running of the 
statute. 
 
The Lanham Act requires that the holder of a trademark 
submit an affidavit between the fifth and sixth years after 
registration of the trademark to establish that the mark is 
currently in use in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (Supp. 
1997). The PTO registered the trademark DPM on April 19, 
1983; therefore, Vujevich had to submit an affidavit 
establishing the continued use of the mark by April 18, 
1989 to maintain the registration. Pursuant to § 1058, 
Vujevich submitted the allegedly fraudulent affidavits on 
February 27, 1989, thereby successfully continuing the 
registration of the trademark DPM listing Vujevich as the 
sole owner and user of the mark. Use of this mark under 
certain conditions became incontestable pursuant to 15 
U.S.C. § 1065. 
 
It does not appear that the constructive notice provision 
of § 1072 under the Lanham Act applies to the submission 
 
                                14 
of affidavits under § 1058 to register the trademark or 
under § 1065 to establish incontestability. The briefs of the 
parties and our own exhaustive search reveal no case law 
establishing that the act of confirming the trademark's 
continued use in commerce satisfies the constructive notice 
provision of § 1072. Additionally, the language of § 1072, 
which speaks to "[r]egistration of the trademark on the 
principal register" as constructive notice does not apply to 
the submission of affidavits five years later pursuant to 
§ 1058 and § 1065 of the Lanham Act. Thus, we agree with 
the plaintiffs that, under Pennsylvania law, thefiling of the 
user affidavits by Vujevich did not constitute constructive 
notice sufficient to begin the running of the statute of 
limitations. 
 
The plaintiffs' claim may still be time-barred, however, 
because they may have had actual notice of the alleged 
fraudulent re-registration as early as 1991. The plaintiffs' 
amended complaint charges that Vujevich began using the 
DPM trademark improperly in 1991. The complaint states: 
"On or about March 1991, Defendants began marketing 
and selling in interstate commerce skin products under the 
name VU Skin Systems. These skin products were sold 
under the label DPM Skin Systems products and/or DPM, 
using the mark DPM without license, or any other form of 
approval, from Beauty Time (PA)." The language of the 
complaint does not establish conclusively whether the 
plaintiffs had actual knowledge of these dealings as early as 
1991; they now assert that they did not become aware of 
the allegedly improper use of the trademark by Vujevich 
until 1994. If the plaintiffs were aware of the use in 1991, 
this knowledge should have "awake[ned] inquiry and 
direct[ed] diligence in a channel in which it would be 
successful." Urland, 882 F.2d at 1273. Thus, if the 
plaintiffs knew of this conduct in 1991, then the suit 
should have been brought within two years of that 
discovery and should now properly be deemed time-barred. 
However, if the plaintiffs did not learn of this alleged fraud 
until 1994, then the action brought in 1995 is well-within 
the two-year statute of limitations for fraud established by 
Pennsylvania law. 
 
The district court, however, failed to determine when the 
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plaintiffs actually learned of the alleged fraudulent re- 
registration. Thus, the order dismissing the complaint must 
be vacated and the matter remanded to the district court 
for further proceedings to determine when the plaintiffs 
first became aware that Vujevich was using the DPM 





The plaintiffs also argue that the district court erred in 
dismissing Counts IV, V, and VI of their remaining claims 
for lack of standing.6 A district court's decision to dismiss 
an action for lack of standing is subject to plenary review. 
Chem Service v. Environmental Monitoring Sys. Lab.- 
Cincinnati of the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, 12 F.3d 1256, 1261 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
The district court held that the plaintiffs' state-law claims 
for trademark infringement and violation of the 
Pennsylvania Anti-Dilution Statute should be dismissed 
because the plaintiffs failed to show an effective assignment 
of the trademark and failed to establish that they had first 
rights to the trademark, a prerequisite to ownership rights 
in the trademark. The plaintiffs assert that they maintained 
common-law rights in the trademark regardless of the 
alleged inadequacies of the oral assignment, and that they 
therefore had standing to bring these state law claims as 
owners of the trademark. 
 
The plaintiffs have not alleged that the trademark was 
acquired in connection with the sale of a business or 
otherwise transferred in connection with the goodwill 
associated with the trademark. Accordingly, the attempted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Once the district court ascertains the date on or about which the 
plaintiffs became aware of the alleged unauthorized use of the DPM 
trademark, the court must determine whether that knowledge was 
sufficient to begin the running of the statute of limitations on both the 
claim of fraudulent re-registration as to ownership of the trademark and 
the claim for failing to declare the plaintiffs' junior use of the trademark. 
 
6. On appeal, the plaintiffs do not challenge the district court's order 
dismissing Counts 1 through 3 and Counts 7 through 10. 
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oral assignment was an assignment in gross and was 
invalid. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 
U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Family Circle Inc. v. Family Circle 
Associates, Inc., 332 F.2d 534, 539 (3d Cir. 1964). The 
Anti-Dilution Statute expressly provides a remedy only for 
"a mark registered under this chapter, or a mark valid at 
common law." 54 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1124 (1996). Common 
law trademark protections only apply when the trademark 
is validly acquired. The plaintiffs did not acquire any 
ownership rights in the trademark under Pennsylvania law, 
and the mark is neither registered nor valid at common 
law. See Browning King Co. of New York v. Browning King 
Co., 176 F.2d 105, 105 (3d Cir. 1949) (under Pennsylvania 
common law, trademarks cannot be transferred in gross). 
Therefore the plaintiffs have no standing to bring a claim 
for infringement or dilution under Pennsylvania law. Thus, 
we perceive no error by the district court in dismissing 
Counts IV and V of the plaintiffs' amended complaint 
seeking relief for common-law trademark infringement and 
violations of the state Anti-Dilution Statute. 
 
Count VI of the plaintiffs' state law claims, which was 
dismissed under the pendant jurisdiction doctrine for lack 
of original jurisdiction over a state law claim, will be 
reinstated pending resolution of the matters remanded to 




Accordingly, the district court's order dismissing the 
plaintiffs' amended complaint will be vacated with respect 
to Count XI (fraud under the Lanham Act) and the case 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Additionally, the order 
dismissing Count VI will be vacated and the claim 
reinstated for further proceedings. 
 
Costs taxed against the appellees. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
In this action, plaintiffs asserted a claim for fraud under 
the Lanham Act. Since the Lanham Act does not specify a 
statute of limitations for such a claim, we look to the state 
statute of limitations that applies to an analogous state law 
cause of action. It is undisputed that the applicable statute 
of limitations here is the two-year bar for fraud actions 
contained in 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524(7) and that this limitations 
period begins to run at the time the fraudulent act is 
completed. It is also undisputed that, in evaluating whether 
§ 5524(7) bars plaintiffs' fraud claim, we borrow 
Pennsylvania's tolling rules. Thus far I am in agreement 
with the majority. 
 
My disagreement with the majority lies in its choice of 
tolling rules. The majority holds that the "discovery rule," 
under which the statute of limitations is tolled "until the 
plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned through 
the exercise of due diligence of the existence of the claim," 
applies to fraud claims. Maj. Op. at 14. As I read the 
Pennsylvania cases, however, the statute of limitations for 
a fraud claim is tolled only if the tortfeasor, after carrying 
out the concealment inherent in the tort, committed 
additional acts of concealment. Turtzo v. Boyer, 88 A.2d 
884, 885 (Pa. 1952). Because plaintiffs do not even argue 
that defendants committed any such acts, plaintiffs cannot 
obtain the benefit of tolling under Pennsylvania law, and 




The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has squarely held that 
"[i]n an action based upon a fraud" the statute of 
limitations is tolled only if "such fraud has been actively 
concealed by the wrongdoer." Turtzo, 88 A.2d at 885. As the 
court explained, "fraud or concealment in the original 
transaction" is insufficient to extend the time for filing suit; 
"to excuse delay of the injured party in asserting his rights 
there must be an independent act of fraud or concealment 
which misled or prevented discovery." Id. This proposition 
was established as a matter of Pennsylvania law as early as 
1901, Smith v. Blachley, 47 A. 985 (Pa. 1901), and has 
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been repeatedly reaffirmed in recent years. Northampton 
Cty. Area Commun. College v. Dow Chemical, U.S.A., 566 
A.2d 591, 599 (Pa. Super. 1989) ("If the party committing 
fraud is also guilty of some acts of concealment or 
deception which hide[ ] from the plaintiff that he has a 
cause of action, then the statute will run from the time 
discovery of the alleged fraud is made, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have been made."), aff'd, 598 
A.2d 1288 (Pa. 1991) (per curiam); In re Estate of Doerr, 
565 A.2d 1207, 1211 (Pa. Super. 1989) ("[A] cause of action 
arising from fraud is complete when the transaction has 
ended[;] . . . the statute of limitations begins to run at once, 
unless discovery is prevented by active concealment.") 
(emendations in original) (quotation omitted). Accord In re 
Thorne's Estate, 25 A.2d 811, 815 (Pa. 1942); Dalzell v. 
Lewis, 97 A. 407, 408-09 (Pa. 1916); In re McKay, 110 B.R. 
764, 767 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990). 
 
In Smith v. Blachley, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
reviewed the precedents at length and discussed two 
competing views of tolling in actions for fraud. The court 
explained: 
 
It is said, in general, that in cases of fraud the statute 
runs only from discovery, or from when, with 
reasonable diligence, there ought to have been 
discovery. But a distinction is made in regard to the 
starting point between fraud completed and ending 
with the act which gives rise to the cause of action and 
fraud continued afterwards in efforts or acts tending to 
prevent discovery. On this distinction there are two 
widely divergent views. It is held, on the one hand, that 
the fraud, though complete and fully actionable, 
operates as of itself a continuing cause of action until 
discovery; while, on the other hand, it is held that, 
when the cause of action is once complete, the statute 
begins to run, and suit must be brought within the 
prescribed term, unless discovery is prevented by some 
additional and affirmative fraud done with that intent. 
 
Id. at 985 (emphasis added). The court unambiguously 
aligned itself with the latter view, declaring that "[w]e regard 
the distinction as sound, well marked, and in harmony with 
the spirit and letter of the statute." Id. at 987. The court 
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observed that a tolling rule that delayed the running of the 
statute in all cases of fraud until discovery of the fraud 
would be incompatible with the settled rule that a cause of 
action for fraud accrues upon consummation of the fraud. 
 
The cases which hold that, where fraud is concealed, 
or, as sometimes added, conceals itself, the statute 
runs only from discovery, practically repeal[ ] the 
statute pro tanto. Fraud is always concealed. If it was 
not, no fraud would ever succeed. But, when it is 
accomplished and ended, the rights of the parties are 




In other words, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
reasoned as follows: The statute of limitations for fraud 
claims embodies a legislative judgment that, at least in 
typical cases, the plaintiff should begin suit within the 
specified period after the fraud occurs. Since the legislature 
presumably realized that some concealment is inherent in 
fraud, the legislature presumably realized as well that there 
will typically be some lag time between the occurrence of 
the fraud and its discovery by the victim. Thus, the 
legislature presumably took this typical lag time into 
account in framing the statute of limitations in thefirst 
place and it is therefore not appropriate for the courts to 
recognize a tolling rule to account for this sort of typical lag 
time. Only when there is the atypical lag time that results 
from subsequent acts of concealment is such a tolling rule 
appropriate. 
 
The majority opines that it would be "inexplicabl[e]" for 
Pennsylvania to apply the liberal discovery rule to other tort 
claims and to subject fraud claims to a different, tougher 
tolling rule. Maj. Op. at 6. See also Maj. Op. at 11 (it 
"makes no sense" to say that a victim of fraud who does not 
discover the fraud during the two-year limitations period 
cannot recover unless the defendant actively concealed the 
fraud subsequent to its completion). I disagree. 
 
While I might well agree that the majority's tolling rule 
represents sound public policy, it does not seem to me to 
be the rule that Pennsylvania has adopted, and I certainly 
do not think that Pennsylvania's apparent choice is either 
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"inexplicabl[e]" or irrational. In my view, the foregoing 
discussion and excerpt from Smith v. Blachley reveal why 
fraud claims might be viewed as requiring different 
treatment. Causes of action for fraud are unique in that 
they always involve concealment. In contrast, only a 
minority of actions for other torts involve conduct that was 
concealed from the victim at the time it was committed. An 
individual cause of action for personal injury, for example, 
is distinguished from the norm when it is alleged that the 
tortious conduct was concealed and that the plaintiff was 
unable to discover it until a subsequent time. Thus, in 
Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959), the court held, 
notwithstanding the two-year statute of limitations, that the 
plaintiff could maintain his suit against a surgeon who had 
negligently failed to remove a sponge from the plaintiff's 
intestines following surgery nine years earlier. Since the 
statute of limitations was designed for the paradigmatic 
personal injury case in which the plaintiff becomes aware of 
the injury at the time when the defendant performs the 
tortious act, it would be unfair and "illogical" to apply it to 
a case in which the plaintiff "does not know, and cannot 
know, for example, that a surgeon has negligently left a 
rubber tube in his body." Id. at 789. 
 
The same rationale applies to other causes of action. In 
Lewey v. H.C. Frick Coke Co., 31 A. 261 (Pa. 1895), the 
plaintiff sued the defendant in trespass, contending that it 
had intruded onto his lands and stolen coal from beneath 
the surface. As in Ayers, the court emphasized that the 
plaintiff had no way of knowing that the invasion and theft 
were taking place, since "[h]e [could not] be present in the 
interior of the earth." Id. at 263-64. Many trespasses, like 
many personal injuries, are immediately apparent to a 
diligent plaintiff, but this particular trespass was not. 
Therefore, while in the usual trespass case the statute of 
limitations begins running upon commission of the 
trespass, "the statute runs against an injury committed in 
or to a lower stratum from the time of actual discovery, or 
the time when discovery was reasonably possible." Id. at 264.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Contrary to the majority's implication, Lewey is poor authority for the 
application of the discovery rule to fraud causes of action for the 
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In contrast, since fraud always involves an element of 
concealment, something more is needed to distinguish a 
particular fraud claim from the norm. Accordingly, while 
the presence of concealment in a particular personal injury 
case might provide a sufficient reason to toll the statute in 
that case, under the reasoning of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, something more, namely, an independent 
act of concealment, is required for tolling in a fraud case. 
This reasoning might lead one to question the wisdom of 
the legislature's enactment of a two-year statute of 
limitations for fraud claims. But it goes without saying that 
we are bound to apply the law of Pennsylvania whether or 
not we think it wise. 
 
In my view, the foregoing clearly establishes that, at least 
at the time of Turtzo, it was the law in Pennsylvania that 
the fraud statute of limitations was tolled only upon a 
showing that the defendant engaged in affirmative acts of 
concealment, independent of the original fraud. The 
majority concludes that, at the present time, "there is no 
such general rule in Pennsylvania," and indeed holds the 
precise opposite: "when the underlying claim sounds in 
fraud, the statute of limitations is tolled by the tortious 
conduct, without any further action by the wrongdoer, until 
the fraud should have been discovered by the plaintiffs." 
Maj. Op. at 10-11. In reaching this conclusion, the majority 
distinguishes the cases I have cited and relies upon some 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
additional reason that the court in Lewey actually held only that "the 
equitable rule that the statute shall run only from discovery, or a time 
when discovery might have been made, should be applied by courts of 
law" confronted with claims for equitable relief. Id. at 264. I do not 
dispute that "[g]enerally, courts have followed the old chancery rule 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court that when a party `has 
been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance without any fault or 
want of diligence or care on his part, the bar to the statute does not 
begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special 
circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to 
conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.' " Maj. Op. at 5 (quoting 
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)). But that principle is 
explicitly a principle of equity, and it is thus applicable only to claims in 
equity. Here, it is not contended that plaintiffs' Lanham Act fraud claim 
sounds in equity. The majority's reliance on Holmberg is thus unsound. 
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recent cases (mostly not decisions of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court) that create some ambiguity regarding the 
current state of Pennsylvania law with respect to the 
requirement of fraudulent concealment independent of the 
original fraud.2 
 
I acknowledge that the cases have not been free from 
ambiguity in confirming the vitality of the rule dating from 
Smith v. Blachley. But the important point is that the Smith 
v. Blachley rule has never been repudiated by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court or Superior Court. Nor do I 
see any clear evidence in the state appellate decisions that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would overrule Smith v. 
Blachley if given the chance. At least without far stronger 




2. In fact, several of the cases cited by the majority are at best 
ambiguous in their support of its conclusion. In Bickell v. Stein, 435 
A.2d 610 (Pa. Super. 1981), the court stated that the "doctrine of 
fraudulent concealment appears somewhat narrower than the discovery 
rule, because it requires a showing that defendant himself prevented 
plaintiff from discovering the facts by acts of deception which were 
independent of the acts giving rise to [the] cause of action." Id. at 612 n.3 
(emphasis added). It is true that the court then went on to note its 
opinion that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment had been "relaxed," 
id., but the case hardly stands clearly for the holding announced by the 
majority. The same is true of Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Cooperative 
Assoc., 463 F.2d 470, 482 (3d Cir. 1972), where we in fact held that "the 
governing standard" was whether there was "an affirmative, independent 
act of concealment." While in Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 
Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1280 (3d Cir. 1991), we did hold the statute 
of limitations tolled because of "inherent fraud" in the "self-concealing" 
false statements in the defendant's certifications that it was making the 
required benefit fund contributions, the fraudulent concealment (the 
certifications) was in fact independent of the wrong sued upon (the 
failure to pay the contributions). Finally, the majority relies on Pocono 
Int'l Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468 (Pa. 1983). The 
court in Pocono, however, only discussed the discovery rule as a prelude 
to finding that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred in any event because 
it could have learned of its injury through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence. Id. at 471. In addition to the cases cited by the majority, see 
Deemer v. Weaver, 187 A.215, 216 (Pa. 1936). 
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II. 
 
Accordingly, it seems to me that under Pennsylvania law, 
as it now stands, a different showing is required to toll the 
statute of limitations for fraud claims, § 5524(7), than for 
other types of claims. While the statute is tolled for most 
tort claims if the plaintiff, "despite the exercise of due 
diligence, is unable to know of the existence of the injury 
and its cause," Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 924 (3d Cir. 
1991), the statute is tolled for a fraud claim only if the 
defendant actively conceals the completed fraud. Since 
plaintiffs here do not even contend that defendants 
committed any independent acts of concealment, I would 
hold that plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of tolling under 
the Pennsylvania law governing fraud actions. Here, as in 
Turtzo, "[a]ssuming, as alleged, there were fraud in the 
execution of the affidavit[ ] [in connection with the re- 
registration application], there was no independent act of 
fraud or concealment which misled plaintiff[s] or prevented 
discovery." 88 A.2d at 886 (emphasis in original) (quotation 
omitted). See also Smith, 47 A. at 987 ("It is true that the 
defendant obtained the money, as the jury have found, by 
a scheme of the grossest fraud and deception, and used all 
possible efforts to prevent plaintiffs from finding out the 
truth; but all these were in the transaction itself and prior 
to its consummation."). Absent tolling, it is undisputed that 
plaintiffs' Lanham Act fraud claim is barred by§ 5524(7)'s 
two-year statute of limitations. I would therefore affirm the 
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Lanham Act fraud 
claim.3 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. I agree with the majority's affirmance of the dismissal of plaintiffs' 
state law dilution and infringement claims. Plaintiffs have not appealed 
the dismissal of the remainder of their federal claims, so I would affirm 
the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs' other state law claims once all of their federal claims had been 
dismissed. 
 
                                24 
